

一、根據 Coase 的交易成本理論，一個廠商向市場採購原料所發生的使用市場之「交易成本」，與一個組織自己內部生產該原料，並且自行使用而發生的「行政成本」，兩者在本質上有何差異？請說明兩者有否差異的理由，並解說如何降低上述「交易成本」或「行政成本」？ (25%)

二、請就以下市場模型的假設：(25%)

1. 最大的生產者 (主宰廠商, Dominant firm) 完全控制了市場價格。
2. 所有其他的廠商像完全競爭廠商一樣，它們個別的需求函數在主宰廠商制定的價格是有完全彈性的。
3. 主宰廠商能夠預測市場需求曲線。
4. 主宰廠商只考慮它可能對市場產量和價格產生的影響。
5. 主宰廠商能夠預測在每一價格上其他賣主的供給。

請分析在上述假設下，主宰廠商 (Dominant firm) 的價格領導模型，並說明當其他廠商不再追隨主宰廠商所制定之價格所產生的結果，以及主宰廠商如何不讓上述結果發生的對策。

三. (15%) Short Answer Question-Explain why you agree or disagree.

(i). If a firm faces a demand with an elasticity higher than 1, then he can increase his profit by cutting the price.

(ii) A risk-averse consumer prefers a sure payoff  $x$  to a lottery with an expected payoff equal to  $x$ .

(iii) If a monopolist has to charge a price lower than its domestic price in order for successfully entering a foreign market, then it should never do so even if it can price discriminate between the two markets (domestic and foreign markets).

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科目 91 個體經濟學 - 2

第 2 頁 / 共 2 頁

四、(35%) Consider two manufacturers distribute products through their own exclusive retail stores. There are two segments of consumers, each of which has a size equal to 1. Consumers in segment  $i$  are familiar with manufacturer  $i$ 's product and obtain gross utility  $r$  for sure from consuming the product; however, from consuming the unfamiliar brand (i.e., product  $j$ ), they obtain gross utility  $r+f$  with probability  $q$  and  $r-f$  with probability  $1-q$ , where  $q \leq 1/2$ ,  $f > 0$ , and  $i, j=1,2$  and  $i \neq j$ . Consumers know their exact utility attached to the unfamiliar brand only after inspecting the *physical product* on the selling spot by incurring a transportation cost  $k$  to its exclusive store. When a consumer visits the store of the unfamiliar brand and finds out a bad fit (i.e., with utility equal to  $r-f$ ) with the unfamiliar brand, he has three options: switching to another exclusive store to buy the familiar brand by incurring a switching cost  $s$ ; buying the unfamiliar brand with a bad fit; buying nothing. Assume that  $s < k$ . Suppose that the prices of the two brands are the same, denoted by  $p$ , which is less than  $r-k$ . Consumers maximize their expected utility and make their brand choices (and hence their store choices) before shopping.

- (i) What would be the optimal subsequent shopping behavior when consumers decide to visit the exclusive store of the unfamiliar brand (i.e., search) and find out a bad fit?
- (ii) Under what conditions (expressed in terms of the relation among parameters) will consumers decide to buy their familiar brand (i.e., no search) by going to the exclusive store of their familiar brand?

Now suppose that both manufacturers expand to the Internet channel in addition to the physical retail channel. If consumers purchase products on the Net, they can save the transportation cost  $k$ . Whenever consumers find out a bad fit in their searching process, they can choose to go home and make orders for the familiar brand on the Net. Suppose that the prices of the two brands are the same and less than or equal to  $r$ .

- (iii) What would be the optimal subsequent shopping behavior when consumers decide to search and find out a bad fit after visiting the exclusive store of the unfamiliar brand?
- (iv) Under what conditions will consumers decide to buy their familiar brand (i.e., no search) through the Internet channel?
- (v) Compare the results in (ii) and in (iv) and provide intuitions.
- (vi) Give at least two managerial implications from this simple example.

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